The governing method behind Tillis’ latest deal

Sen. Thom Tillis, R-NC, may have been a roadblock in the eyes of many of President Trump’s most loyal supporters. They view some of his recent decisions as acts of defiance, not principled governance.

But the choices frustrating the Republican base also reflect a powerful governing style Tillis developed long before he arrived in Washington.

When Tillis was speaker of the North Carolina House, he was clear that governing is not simply about announcing the right goal or satisfying the loudest voices in the room. It requires counting votes, determining whether a policy will work, understanding who will implement it, and considering who will pay the price when the details go wrong.

That same methodical and sometimes politically costly approach is evident in his final months in the US Senate.

During the dispute over Todd Blanche’s nomination for US attorney general, Tillis did more than register a protest. He and Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, withheld their support because of provisions arising from the settlement of President Trump’s lawsuit against the Internal Revenue Service.

Their concerns included a proposed $1.8 billion fund for people claiming they had been subjected to politically motivated government action. They also questioned the breadth of tax-related protections contained in the settlement for Trump, members of his family, and affiliated businesses.

Tillis agreed to move forward after the US Justice Department put its response in writing. The department formally rescinded the order establishing the fund and issued a written clarification addressing the scope of the tax provisions.

“We are pleased that the Department of Justice has issued a formal order terminating the anti-weaponization fund,” Tillis and Cornyn said in a joint statement. “Additionally, the Department has acknowledged in a binding written order that the audit settlement is limited to the plaintiffs and the scope does not extend beyond the defendants in the lawsuit, the IRS and the Treasury, addressing concerns that multiple of our Republican colleagues share.”

They thanked Blanche and his staff and said they would vote to advance his nomination from the Senate Judiciary Committee.

The episode shows how a former state legislator uses leverage: identify the disputed language, demand a written response, and decide whether the response is sufficient before casting a consequential vote.

I worked with North Carolina’s new Republican majority during the pivotal 2011 legislative session. Republican lawmakers who had spent years in the chambers’ back rows suddenly had to govern and put their policies to the test. Under then-Speaker Tillis and Senate Leader Phil Berger, the state began a dramatic shift in fiscal and regulatory policy.

There were growing pains, certainly. But behind the scenes, I saw how lawmakers worked, including several who later rose to higher office. I watched Tillis closely enough to know that he was rarely satisfied with a symbolic assurance. He wanted language that could be implemented, examined, and defended.

What did a proposal actually say, rather than what did its supporters promise? Could it be implemented? Who would have authority? What consequences had not been considered? Did the person making the case have the votes to deliver?

Whether you agree with Tillis or not, he has brought that habit to Capitol Hill. His handling of the Blanche nomination was consistent with the governing style I saw in Raleigh.

That does not mean Tillis has always been right, or that conservatives should agree with every vote cast by someone with an “R” after his or her name. Many North Carolina Republicans voice reasons to disagree with him, and some will remain unconvinced by his recent decisions.

But this week’s negotiations demonstrated a governing skill too often absent in Washington: using leverage to turn a concern into a concrete result.

WHAT HAPPENED?

In case you need a primer, the dispute began with a May settlement of President Trump’s lawsuit over the unauthorized disclosure of his tax information. As part of the agreement, the Justice Department established what it called an “Anti-Weaponization Fund,” backed by nearly $1.8 billion, for future claimants alleging politically motivated government action. The settlement also contained broad language involving tax claims and examinations.

Acting AG Blanche testified that the fund would not move forward. Tillis and Cornyn nevertheless wanted that assurance, along with limits on the tax provisions, put in writing before they supported his nomination.

Following negotiations, Blanche issued an order rescinding the earlier order that had established the fund. The Justice Department also issued written language limiting the tax-related release to the plaintiffs in the case and to claims existing as of the settlement’s effective date.

The documents satisfied Tillis and Cornyn, although critics continued to question whether a future administration action could revive the fund.

On Aug. 4, the Senate Judiciary Committee advanced Blanche’s nomination on a 12–10 party-line vote, sending it to the full Senate.

The dispute could easily have hardened into another round of intraparty warfare. Instead, the senators and the administration narrowed the disagreement enough to find a way forward.

There is also a larger lesson here. Nearly every action involving Trump is treated as either an existential threat or an unquestionable test of loyalty. That leaves little room to distinguish between an objection to an administration’s goal and an objection to the language chosen to carry it out.

Here, Tillis separated the two. He focused on the provisions he believed were too broad and used his committee vote to press for written changes.

The administration, for its part, recognized that providing clarification did not require abandoning its nominee. Its response secured the senators’ votes and allowed the nomination to advance.

That is one contribution state legislative experience can make in a polarized Washington. State officials must live with what happens after a bill is signed. They must administer programs, balance budgets, write rules and explain the consequences to voters.

Tillis learned that lesson on the floor and in the halls of the North Carolina House. His broader record will remain a subject of debate long after he leaves office. The Blanche agreement offers a narrower lesson.

Washington rewards declarations of victory. Raleigh teaches that a policy is only as sound as its language, its implementation and its effect on the people back home.

In this case, Tillis brought that lesson to the negotiating table and left with something in writing.